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ABSTRACT: I propose in this paper that Foucault’s interest in parrhesia as a “technique of the 
self,” particularly in his reading of Cynic parrhesia, can be fruitfully taken as an exemplar for new 
political thought on leadership. I make my case by comparing parrhesia with Weber’s charisma, 
which is the only force Weber allows for inserting new valuations into traditional and rational-
legal legitimate dominations. I propose that charisma and parrhesia not only share several key 
characteristics, but express an overabundance of identities. Although it is rarely acknowledged, I 
propose that this should hardly be surprising given Foucault’s longstanding interest in Weber’s 
work. Foucault’s governmentality can be productively set next to Weber’s psycho-sociology of 
modern man, Menschentum, to reveal the parallel courses taken by these two thinkers on the mod-
ern predicament. Both share a critical curiosity – one that revolves around Kant’s presentation in 
“What is Enlightenment?” – about life, and about seeing how we have come to be how we are as a 
philosophical problem. Yet, even with all of their parallels, particularly on the subject of leader-
ship, the staggering difference between Foucault and Weber is that while Weber approached cha-
risma as a possible therapy to the problem of the Menschentum being unable to derive new valua-
tions from his rational-legal calculations, Foucault approached parrhesia by looking for tech-
niques for confronting disciplined and biopolitical subjects within society with dangerous truths. 
Whereas conventional wisdom may presume that it is at such points as Weber’s charismatic lead-
ership that Weber and Foucault would part ways, careful study shows that leadership is a point 
of connection between these two thinkers. 
 
Keywords: Parrhesia, Weber, Menschentum, Governmentality, Leadership 
 
Introduction 
This paper locates leadership in the context of practices of subject formation as a process distinct 
from leadership in the commonsense context of already individuated subjects. My focus is on 
leadership in Foucault’s “practices of the self,” practices of self-creation of the subject in relation 
to truth, and particularly on Foucault’s notion of “parrhesia” or bold speech. I make my approach 
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to this question by way of Max Weber’s concept of charisma, and propose several affinities be-
tween Foucault’s parrhesia and Weber’s charisma. For Weber, the problem with the state in capi-
talism is that it alone does not have an ability to instill value into modern life. To address this, 
Weber offers plebiscatory and party politics as means through which charisma could transform a 
society’s hearts and minds. I argue that in a move parallel to Weber’s, Foucault proposes parrhe-
sia as a means by which the subject can act at the intersection of power and knowledge, and by 
which totalizing and individualizing power can be confronted. For both Weber and Foucault, 
there seems to be a felt absence of leadership in the present age. However, the affinities between 
the two thinkers reveal their underlying difference at this point, and I argue that Foucault’s pro-
ject of uncovering parrhesia runs counter to Weber’s hopes for charisma. 
This paper is presented in three sections. The first section looks for similarities between 
Weber’s and Foucault’s respective concepts of charisma and parrhesia. Finding that the two con-
cepts are not only affinal but exhibit an overabundance of identities, the second section takes a 
different tack by moving from an assumption of affinal relations to inquire into the source of their 
difference. In brief, the difference between the two concepts rests on differences between Weber’s 
and Foucault’s concern with, borrowing Colin Gordon’s term,1 “the soul of the citizen.” In the 
third section I demonstrate that whereas Weber looks pessimistically yet hopefully to a profes-
sionalized society for a capacity to charismatically add value amidst regimented rationality, and 
thus create a citizenship adequate to the challenge of disenchantment in modernity, Foucault’s 
work is marked by an “unwillingness to take the side of society against the state” since society 
itself is the product of disciplinary and biopolitical deployments within pastoral power.2 From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the problem with Weber’s intellectual project does not subsist in the 
concept of charisma or the notion of introducing leadership into relations, but in its aim to use 
state institutions to carry out a disciplinary project. Foucault looks to parrhesia as a mode of lead-
ership that guides the self-creation of the subject within fields of power and knowledge as a force 
capable of confronting society.  
 
Weber’s Charisma and Foucault’s Parrhesia: A Comparison  
In this section, I directly compare the relevant concepts, charisma and parrhesia, that held such a 
central place in the mature writings of Weber and Foucault respectively. Charisma thoroughly 
permeates Weber’s sociology with a transformational potentiality, and parrhesia is important in 
Foucault’s work for being the single “technique of the self” in his search for the “roots” of the 
Western critical tradition in philosophy.3 My intention here is to locate differences and affinities 
                                                 
1 Colin Gordon, "Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government," in Max 
Weber. Rationality and Modernity (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
2 Gordon, "Soul of the Citizen,” 263. 
3 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 170. 
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in these two concepts. Whereas Foucault’s parrhesia is quite a new topic of study4 even among 
Foucauldians – although it has motivated a very recent proliferation of essays5 – Weber’s work on 
charisma may feel to the reader to be overly familiar, well-trodden ground. It is partly for this 
reason that I begin by reading charisma afresh, directly from Weber’s magnum opus Economy and 
Society.  
 
Charisma in Weber’s Economy and Society 
According to Weber, domination can be both legitimate and illegitimate in the eyes of the domi-
nated. Weber conceives three ideal types – rational authority, traditional authority, and charis-
matic authority – as forming the bases of claims that legitimate domination. He describes charis-
matic authority as having five features. Firstly, one makes a claim as to the legitimacy of charis-
matic domination by virtue of a characteristic “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or 
exemplary character” of a person and the order disclosed or created by the person.6 This further 
entails two characteristics; the first being that obedience in charismatic domination is personally 
owed to the leader, in traditional domination it is owed to the person of the chief, while in rational 
domination it is owed to a legally established impersonal order. Additionally, the scope of charis-
matic domination is limited according to those revelations and exemplary qualities in which the 
follower has faith. The particular nature of the charismatic relation, its “charismatic qualification,” 
is infinitely divisible (the charismatic relation may pertain only to one aspect of a person’s life, 
and a charismatic relation may involve more than one charismatic leader) and infinitely variable.7 
The scope of tradition, by contrast, is limited to the domain of accustomed obligations, and legal-
rationalism only extends according to the authority of the office within the legal-rational order.  
As an ideal type, charismatic authority is characterized by individual leadership on the ba-
sis of divine or exemplary qualities that are not, in their locale, considered accessible to the ordi-
                                                 
4 Early accounts of Foucault’s work regarding parrhesia, some excellent, include John Oneill, "The Disciplinary 
Society - from Weber to Foucault," British Journal of Sociology 37, no. 1 (1986) (https://doi.org/10.2307/591050); 
Gordon, "Soul of the Citizen”; David Owen, "Ambiguity of the Modern: Neitzsche, Weber, Foucault, and the 
Fate of the Subject of Modernity" (University of Durham, 1989); Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and 
Truth," Political Theory 12, no. 2 (1984) (https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591784012002002). 
5 These include Jorge Davila, "Ethique De La Parole Et Jeu De La Vérité," in Foucault Et La Philosophie Antique, ed. 
Frédéric Gros and Carlos Lévy (Paris: Kime, 2003); Thomas Flynn, "Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at 
the College De France (1984)," in The Final Foucault, ed. J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1991); David Konstan, "The Prehistory of Sexuality: Foucault's Route to Classical Antiquity," Intertexts 6, 
no. 1 (2002); Thomas Lemke, "Foucault's Hypothesis: From the Critique of the Juridico-Discursive Concept of 
Power to an Analytics of Government," Parrhesia 9(2010); Kimon Lycos, "Foucault, Freedom and Truth 
Emergence," ibid.1(2003); Matthew Sharpe, "'Critique' as Technology of the Self," Foucault Studies 2(2005); Eric 
Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge (New York: Other Press, 2006). 
6 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 215; Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft (Tubingen: Mohr, 1922), 124. 
7 Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, 243. 
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nary person.8 These qualities have, in so-called primitive societies, taken the form of magic, 
prophecy, therapy, legal wisdom, and leadership in the hunt and in war. Weber provides further 
examples of charisma as diverse as the manic passion of the berserk, the Mormon followership of 
Joseph Smith, the demagogic reputation of the Socialist Bavarian revolutionary Kurt Eisner, and 
the Germanic kingship in late Antiquity; all of which are deemed charismatic by virtue of judg-
ment in the charismatic community. Charismatic leadership cannot be representative, because the 
latter’s basis for validity is the representative’s assumption of characteristics already possessed by 
delegates, while with charisma, devotion results from introducing something outside the follow-
ers’ nature.  
A second feature of the charismatic relation is that devotion is exhibited in the followers’ 
sense of a calling; the effect of the leader’s investment of arousal in followers felt as distress, ex-
citement or hope. However, if this hope seems permanently suspended, or if the marvel of ardent 
desire is never consummated, then the charismatic authority may wane.9 For Weber, this essential 
vulnerability of the charismatic relation is the “genuine” pre-modern meaning of the divine right 
of kings. That is, divine right describes both a kingly prerogative to act decisively and an affliction 
insofar as charismatic authority enervates when a king appears deserted by his gods and his lead-
ership fails to affect his followers.10 Weber’s reading of divine right is supported by the preva-
lence of the medieval figure of the king of fools in theater up until today.11 This king of derision 
also appears in Foucault’s comparison of the king of men and the Cynic philosopher’s philoso-
pher-king, and we will return to this shortly.12 
Thirdly, unlike evental revolutionary relations which seem to happen all at once, Weber’s 
charismatic leadership can extend over time. When charismatic leadership is extended, a charis-
matic community develops comprised of disciples to a prophet, a trustis to a warlord, and gener-
ally of agents to a leader.13 Agents, and this is the fourth characteristic, are not passive followers 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 242. 
9 Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft, 140. 
10 Economy and Society: Vol. 1, 242. 
11 Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, "The Clown at the Gates of the Camp: Sovereignty, Resistance and the 
Figure of the Fool," Security Dialogue 44, no. 2 (2013) (https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613479994); Mikhail M. 
Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Paul V.A. Williams, The Fool and 
the Trickster: Studies in Honour of Enid Welsford (Rochester: D. S. Brewer, 1979); Enid Welsford, The Fool: His Social 
and Literary History (London: Faber & Faber, 1968). 
12 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the College De France, 1983-1984, ed. Frederic Gros, trans. 
Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 273-87. 
13 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 2, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1122. The German word Weber uses to generally describe the 
charismatic trustis or community of “disciples” is Vertrauensmänner, which is unfortunately translated to 
“agent” in the English edition Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, 243. I use the Latin 
trustis to highlight the particular position of these followers beyond being agents, and to stress a warrior culture 
in charismatic communities over the priestly culture suggested by the prophetic “disciple.”  
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of charisma, but those stirred by their “charismatic qualifications” – that particular basis of a 
sense of a calling from among infinite possible bases which need not be the same even among 
agents of one leader – who together constitute a community “based on an emotional form of a 
communal relationship.”14 There are no appointments, benefices, dismissals, experts, careers or 
promotions in charismatic communities, nor are there hierarchies, “but only a sense of calling 
aroused by the leaders, on the basis of the charismatic qualification of those who feel called.”15 
Relations within the charismatic community are communistic and provided for by voluntary 
gifts. In the charismatic community’s sharp opposition to bureaucratic or traditional authority, 
there are no abstract legal principles or rational-legal systems of government; instead “formally 
concrete judgments are newly created from case to case and are originally regarded as divine 
judgments and revelations”. Similarly, economic considerations are foreign to the charismatic 
community, where the charismatic relation constitutes a spiritual duty. It is not so much that the 
community does not seek wealth, particularly as a display of authority, but that the calculation of 
wealth and poverty is repugnant to both leader and disciple. “What is despised,” Weber writes, 
“is traditional or rational everyday economizing, the attainment of a regular income by continu-
ous economic activity devoted to this end … [C]harismatic want satisfaction is a typical anti-
economic force.”16  
A fifth characteristic is that Weber presents charisma as the “great” revolutionary force in 
traditionalist societies; a force that is eclipsed in the “iron cage” of capitalist modernity where the 
equally revolutionary force of legal-rationality does not work internally as a transformation from 
the inside that engenders a complete reorientation of engagements in all forms of life, but by the 
power of ratio through intellectualization or “by changing the conditions and problems of life and 
thus, indirectly our engagements with these.”17  
In summary, as an ideal type, charisma is a personal sense of the presence of extraordinary 
qualities in another person and in the leader’s revelations about the order of their world. This 
sense is accompanied by a feeling of being called by, and of feeling devotion to, the leader. Devo-
tion here is a passionate commitment and is infinitely variable and divisible and even revocable 
on the part of those called. The substance and quality of devotion describes an individual’s char-
ismatic qualification. When charisma is extended over time, a charismatic community of a trustis 
forms itself and is characterized by its constitution by individuals with charismatic qualifications; 
emotional communality; an absence of hierarchy and office; anti-economy; and purely substan-
tive and improvised justice. Lastly, the charismatic relation was the great revolutionary force of 
traditional society that has been eclipsed in modernity.  
                                                 
14 Economy and Society: Vol. 1, 243. 
15 “Sondern nur Berufung nach Eingebung des Führers auf Grund der charismatischen Qualifikation des Berufenen.” 
Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft, 141. 
16 Economy and Society: Vol. 1, 244-45. 
17 Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft, 142. 
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Parrhesia in Foucault’s Late Lectures 
In his late lectures, Foucault characterizes his critical work according to the three themes of analy-
sis of forms of governmentality, the history of modes of objectification of the subject in 
knowledge disciplines, and the history of the “care of oneself”; the last of which occurs “at the 
intersection” of the first two in that a history of the care of the self would be a history of subjectiv-
ity that includes relations with oneself and transformations in these relations with new practices 
and effects of technologies of the self.18 Secondly, it would also be a history of governmentality, 
but now of “the government of oneself by oneself in its articulations with relations with others.”19 
Care for the self describes the techniques by which subjects construct relationships to the self and, 
in doing so, direct themselves, others and their worlds.  
For Foucault, the ancient Greek practice of care for the self was not a “spontaneous atti-
tude, a natural movement of subjectivity,” but something that occurred in relation to a recognized 
other, a master, who calls upon and instructs the listener to correct their care of the self and so 
induce positive reconstruction in the listener. By contrast, early Christianity also involved a 
transpersonal care for the self, but the Christian teacher in monastic and confessional traditions 
directs the instruction toward sacrificial renunciation.20 Care for the self in Greek and Roman an-
tiquity takes on a particular political sense.21 It involves the free-spokenness, or parrhesia, of in-
structors who, through cultivation, learning and their own practices of care for the self, possess 
the courage of truth to call upon and direct others to correct their care for the self. Parrhesia, it 
becomes clear, entails a concern for, and participation in discourses on, truth.22 Foucault offers the 
following description in this regard: 
 
[Parrhesia is] a rich, ambiguous, and difficult notion, particularly insofar as it designates a vir-
tue, a quality (some people have parrēsia and others do not); a duty (one must really be able to 
demonstrate parrēsia, especially in certain cases and situations); and a technique, a process 
(some people know how to use parrēsia and others do not). And this virtue, duty, and technique 
must characterize, among other things and above all, the man who is responsible for directing 
                                                 
18 Michel Foucault, "Subjectivity and Truth," in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Work of Foucault, Vol. I, 
ed. P. Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 88. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Frédéric Gros, "Course Context," in The Government of Self and Others, ed. F. Gros, Lectures at the College De 
France (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 378. 
21 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 8. 
22 Foucault’s 1984 interview with H. Becker, R. Fornet-Betancourt, and A. Gomez-Müller serves as a good intro-
duction to the truth games in care for the self "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (New York: Free Press, 1997), 295-96. 
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others, particularly for directing them in their effort, their attempt to constitute an appropriate 
relationship to themselves.23  
 
We see here that parrhesia is a personal quality, a technique, and a duty of one who is responsible 
for directing others in their relationship to the self. 
In Foucault’s last lectures,24 we find roughly six currents of pre-Christian thought regard-
ing parrhesia; each of which distinctively conceives the problem for the subject in relation to 
truth, and so provides distinct techniques by which parrhesia is practiced. These currents roughly 
correspond to (1) Greek democratic thought (Euripedes and Isocrates) about the right of the citi-
zen to speak his mind regarding the affairs of his city, (2) Platonic parrhesia that validates truth-
telling as the defining principle of guiding the Prince’s government of the politeia in which de-
mocracy must be carefully excluded, (3) Socratic conceptions in Plato’s writing with an emphasis 
on Socrates’ courage to approach Athenian citizens and parrhesiatically offer advice, (4) Cynic 
thought in which Cynic courage is Socratic parrhesia made into a “stylistics of existence”, (5) 
Greek and Roman Stoicism, and (6) the Roman work of Plutarch and Galen.  
Foucault does not use a methodology of ideal types like Weber, but he does delineate 
common elements in these quite diverse currents of parrhesia. In all the currents, parrhesia is 
characterized by frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. Another common element is the 
condition of ethical differentiation, namely the differential placement of oneself in the position of 
teacher, as one that possesses something in one’s own existence that one feels must be cultivated 
in others.  
I briefly describe the first (democratic) and third (Socratic) conceptions Foucault presents 
below, followed by a focused review of the fifth (Cynic) conception. I then draw out points of af-
finity between Cynic parrhesia and charisma.  
In the Greek democratic current, a first citizen’s city – its government, its institutions – is 
the object of parrhesia. Parrhesia is at first conceived here in the positive role of seeking to im-
prove the city’s laws and understandings of truth. However, over time parrhesia takes on a sec-
ond meaning as a dangerous practice for democracy that must be exercised within limits and with 
caution.25 The “crisis” seen with respect to parrhesia is not dissimilar to the “crisis” of leadership 
in contemporary political thought on democracy; for example, in Thomas Wren’s writing.26 The 
problem is that in democracy one cannot distinguish between discourse which speaks the truth 
                                                 
23 The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the College De France, 1982-1983, ed. A.I. Davidson and G. Burchell 
(New York: Palgrave, 2011), 43. 
24 Covering three different term-length courses at the College de France in Paris The Hermeneutics of the Subject: 
Lectures at the Collège De France 1981--1982 (New York: Palgrave, 2006); The Government of Self and Others; The 
Courage of Truth; and six lectures presented during Foucault’s time at the University of California in Berkeley 
Fearless Speech. 
25 The Courage of Truth, 36-52. 
26 J.Thomas Wren, Inventing Leadership: The Challenge of Democracy (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2007). 
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and is useful to the city, and discourse which “utters lies, flatters, and is harmful.”27 This is be-
cause the only differentiation permitted in the democratic city is a “quantitative” one that distin-
guishes between the masses and the few, coinciding with the distinction between the worst and 
the best, and the bad and the good, for the city. So parrhesia as truth-telling cannot have its place 
in the democratic game “inasmuch as democracy is unable to recognize and cannot make room 
for the ethical division on the basis of which, and only on the basis of which, truth-telling is pos-
sible.”28  
Plato’s depiction of Socrates, particularly in his Laches, exemplifies Foucault’s third current 
of parrhesia. Here the emphasis is on Socrates’ courage to approach Athenian citizens and offer 
advice, acting like a father or elder brother. This is a face-to-face interpersonal form of parrhesia, 
expressed as the result of a mission to watch over and care for others’ souls, to ensure that they 
attend to themselves. Here the focus of parrhesia is neither the city nor the prince’s soul, but the 
relationship between the individual and “truth founded on the very being of his soul.”29 This aes-
thetic, rather than political, form of parrhesia acts “on the very axis” of ethics by harmonizing life 
with reason. On the one hand, Socrates approaches others as equals in that he too lives under the 
mastery of the autocratic logos. On the other hand, Socrates must, in taking care of himself, put 
“himself in the hands of the missing teacher (the logos),” while formally rejecting the teaching 
role. In this dual role, Socrates “is the one who guides others on the way of the logos.”30  
Foucault presents Cynic courage as Socratic parrhesia made into a “stylistics of exist-
ence.”31 Whereas Socrates courageously approaches the Athenian citizenry as an elder truth-teller, 
with Cynicism this approach is heightened, unmediated by the presumption of equality, and em-
boldened “to the point that it becomes an intolerable nuisance.” The Cynic takes the aesthetics of 
Socratic parrhesia to the point of scandal, but this is a scandal of truth that strips existence bare 
and finds its modern descendants in revolutionism (Foucault mentions Russian nihilism, anar-
chism, and terrorism) and also in art (Baudelaire, Bacon, Burroughs, though one might add Ar-
taud). In extending Socrates’ parrhesia, Cynic parrhesia takes life as testimony of truth, as that 
which produces truth, as nonconcealment, purity, conformity to nature and sovereignty in the 
form of the Cynic’s own life.32 Where Socrates met Athenians as equals with the mission of philo-
sophically guiding others in the way of logos to another world, the Cynic, with a Delphic man-
date to “deface the currency,” met Athenians as an embodiment of philosophy with the egalitari-
an task of showing by one’s own life how their lives are false and that the true life is “other than 
the life led by men in general and philosophers in particular.”33 This, for Foucault, begins the two 
                                                 
27 Foucault, The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the College De France, 1983-1984, 40. 
28 The Courage of Truth, 44. 
29 Ibid., 86. 
30 Ibid., 152. 
31 Ibid., 165. 
32 Ibid., 218. 
33 Ibid., 244. 
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great themes of Western philosophy found in Kant. The first of these is the question of the other 
world, and the second that of an other life. The Cynics, Foucault tells us, by their striving for true 
life, make possible the thought of another world. 
Charisma and parrhesia are similar in that they both introduce the extra-ordinary into 
quotidian life. Both describe an unequal relation between at least two individuals in which one 
speaks or otherwise presents something extra-ordinary. For Foucault, the qualifying criterion for 
being extraordinary is the presentation of a dangerous truth, while for Weber it is an exceptional-
ly heroic act or form of life.  
By the end of his final lectures at the Collège de France, it becomes clear that Foucault’s 
concern with parrhesia revolves around the fifth current of parrhesia found in Diogenes and the 
“Cynic Sect.”34 A closer study of this Cynic current reveals other affinities between Foucault’s and 
Weber’s concepts. For Foucault, revelations attributed to Diogenes and his early disciples about 
truth are central to the Cynic sect, and so, for example, when Foucault describes the basic princi-
ples of Cynic practice, every one of them is based on an aphorism, anecdote, saying, or experience 
in the life of Diogenes.35 Although the sect flourished hundreds of years after Diogenes’ death, 
Foucault notes the personal relationship between Cynic practice and its founder. The most im-
portant of these is the Cynic motto to “falsify the currency” (where “currency” can also be taken 
as social standards and practices). This motto is attributable to a number of legends about Dioge-
nes’ life according to which Diogenes was a money changer who falsified the money, or that Di-
ogenes, upon asking the oracle at Delphi how he could become famous, was told to “alter the cur-
rency.”  
This gives a second point of affinity in addition to their shared introduction of the extra-
ordinary. This second point, specifically between Cynic parrhesia and charisma, is the strong 
sense of calling acutely felt in Foucault’s discussion of Cynic poverty and militancy.36 As with 
Weber’s calling, for Foucault Cynic poverty is not just a matter of acceptance, but a disciplined 
conduct. Foucault adds that the Cynic drive to poverty is incapable of being satisfied and is part 
of an ongoing training in resistance “to everything to do with opinions, beliefs, and conven-
tions.”37 Foucault speaks of the Cynic life of poverty as unconcealed shamelessness, sovereignty 
and animality, which more than a mission, is a missionary battle reminiscent of Weber’s berserk 
battle, which is comprised not only of a militant dedication to poverty, but also of an interven-
tionist care of others as an aggressive benefaction.38 “The Cynics,” Foucault says, “frequently ap-
ply these qualities to themselves, this description of their own mission as a battle ... comparing 
themselves to soldiers of an army who have to mount guard or confront enemies and engage in 
                                                 
34 Fearless Speech, 115. 
35 The Courage of Truth, 238-39. 
36 Ibid., 257-59. 
37 Ibid., 261. 
38 Ibid., 278-79. 
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physical combat.”39 Yet, Cynic poverty is distinct in that the struggle is both internal, against the 
Cynic’s own desires, as well as against the “customs, conventions, institutions, laws, and a whole 
condition of humanity.”40  
A third point of affinity is found in similarities between Weber’s discussion of the charis-
matic trustis or community and Foucault’s depiction of the Cynic sect. Both are anti-economic, but 
two additional features of Weber’s charismatic trustis are found in Foucault’s Cynic sect. First, 
Foucault clearly states that the Cynic sect opposes social organization and hierarchy: “The Cynics 
are opposed to divine and human laws, and to all forms of tradition or social organization.”41 Fur-
thermore, the Cynic cult, as with the charismatic communal form, follows a substantive and im-
provised justice that opposes traditional and rational authority. Foucault writes that the Cynic 
sect practiced a “traditionality of existence” which, rather than following the doctrinal teaching, 
passed on anecdotes and in doing so made use “not so much of a theoretical, dogmatic teaching 
as above all models, stories, anecdotes, and examples.”42  
A fourth point of affinity is the substantive, informal nature of justice within the Cynic 
community, which works via an improvisational bricolage of legends from Cynic lives. Here we 
see that the traditionality Foucault sees is entirely about the lives of cherished founders, and 
stands opposed to Weber’s traditional authority. Foucault is explicit about this. Whereas doctrinal 
tradition “enables a meaning to be maintained or retained beyond forgetfulness” so as to be ap-
plied in present circumstances, Cynicism’s traditionality of existence “enables the strength of 
conduct to be restored beyond moral enfeeblement.”43 That is, whereas the former seeks to main-
tain and retain meaning, the latter recalls elements and episodes of leaders’ lives so as to give life 
once again to those episodes. In giving anecdotes of cherished leaders a new life, the Cynic finds a 
new calling to strengthen conduct and restore morality in the present life.  
In summary, as with the charismatic community, the Cynic sect exhibits a sense of the 
presence of the extraordinary qualities of personalities whose lives continue to guide and lead the 
sect; a sense of calling and devotion to the lives of its leaders; a passionate commitment that im-
bues the sense of calling with a militancy; an absence of tradition and office; and a substantive 
and improvisational sense of justice. Although I am comparing Foucault’s parrhesiastic life of the 
Cynic with the ideal type of charisma – which, according to Weber is a “utopia” that does not ex-
ist in history –the affinities are still striking.  
But the identity does not stop here. Foucault adds that “through this traditionality of exist-
ence we see emerging—and this is very clear in the Cynics, much more than in any other form of 
philosophy, much more even than in Epicureanism or Stoicism—that figure, which is so important, 
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of the philosophical hero.”44 This figure, the philosophical hero, rests chronologically between the 
sage and the Christian holy man, between archaic tradition and the last centuries of Antiquity, 
and is the “essence of philosophical heroism” in its “most general, rudimentary, and also de-
manding aspect.”45 “Philosophical heroism,” Foucault adds, “the philosophical life as heroic life, 
was something put in place and handed down by this Cynic tradition.” 
Foucault is plainly saying here that the Cynic sect is not only made up of followers of a he-
ro, but, on top of this, that the Western tradition of philosophical heroism is itself born with the 
Cynic tradition. In setting out to study the possibility of affinity between charisma and parrhesia, 
what seems to have been obtained is identity, with the addition that parrhesia is the charismatic 
form of the Western philosophical tradition. One could say that, in Cynic fashion, identity has 
been driven to identity’s dishonor, lurching into a claim of priority and origination. To under-
stand better how this has come about, I will compare Foucault’s and Weber’s oeuvres in the next 
section. 
Before ending this comparison, a fifth point of affinity between charisma and parrhesia 
must be pointed out. As charisma, for Weber, was eclipsed in modernity, Foucault declares par-
rhesia to have all but disappeared by the nineteenth century, except in the revolutionary life. Oth-
er than pointing out that Foucault makes reference in it to Weber’s hero, Goethe, the passage be-
low needs no introduction: 
 
Obviously, this history of philosophy as ethics and heroism would come to a halt when, as you 
know, philosophy became a teaching profession, that is to say, at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century … [This is] also the moment when the legend of the philosophical life receives its 
highest and last literary expression. This is, of course, Goethe’s Faust … When philosophy be-
comes a teaching profession, the philosophical life disappears. Unless we want to recommence 
this history of the philosophical life, of philosophical heroism, in exactly the same period, but in 
a completely different, displaced form. Philosophical heroism, philosophical ethics will no 
longer find a place in the practice of philosophy as a teaching profession, but in that other, dis-
placed and transformed form of philosophical life in the political field: the revolutionary life. 
Exit Faust, and enter the revolutionary.46 
 
Foucault and Weber on the Divine Right of Kings 
The theme of monarchy’s fragility is common to both Foucault’s and Weber’s conception of mon-
archy. As I have shown above, this was expressed by Weber as the meaning of divine right in the 
concept of the “divine right of kings.” Whereas the phrase is generally understood to mean a right 
for kings to do anything because their rule is derived directly from God, Weber offers a quite dif-
ferent meaning. Weber distinguishes divine right from other rights by making it dependent on 
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the King’s ability to provide heil, “health,” to his following.47 If fortune has turned on the king and 
his people no longer feel they are in the presence of his charism, then his charismatic authority is 
liable to wither. When this occurs, the worst fate befalls the king, who now becomes a king of de-
rision.  
 The figure of the king of derision stands out in Foucault’s reading of Cynic parrhe-
sia in a passage where he discusses a legendary meeting between Diogenes and Alexander of 
Macedon. The meeting is depicted as one of kings. While for Stoics the philosopher ought to be 
king, the Cynic narrative of this meeting goes beyond the constraint of “ought” to directly declare 
that Diogenes is king. The Cynic philosopher is an anti-king who exposes the precarity of monar-
chy. The Cynic’s kingship is not vulnerable precisely because it is not divine. Foucault tells us that 
there are four ways in which the Cynic is an anti-king.48 First, whereas kings like Alexander must 
depend on other things (guards, allies, armor, etc.), the Cynic anti-king does nothing more than 
exercise sovereignty. Second, while kings must be cultivated into monarchs, the sage’s soul is al-
ready fully endowed with greatness and virility. Third, a king’s fragility is eternal only as long as 
he battles his enemies, but the anti-king is forever virile for waging an everlasting battle with his 
own faults and vices. Fourth, while the king of men is eternally exposed to a reversal of fortune, 
the anti-king is king by nature and so king forever. More than this, the Cynic anti-king is already 
the king of derision, and in fact becomes king through a scandalous dedication to poverty.49 The 
Cynic anti-king’s unwelcome gift, unlike the king’s charism, is a harsh medication administered in 
the form of aggressive benefaction that cannot be returned and annulled. Whereas Alexander 
momentarily possesses the divine right of kings, Diogenes’ kingship is solid and eternal.  
 Here we see a major distinction between Weber’s charisma and Foucault’s parrhe-
sia. Whereas Weber’s charisma includes kings whose divine right makes them vulnerable to los-
ing their charisma, the Cynic king has no such fear. Weber writes that charisma exists as the only 
type of authority that carries the force to transform people from within, and Foucault appears to 
be in agreement. However, Foucault’s divergence from Weber’s conceptualization is in Foucault’s 
stress on parrhesiastic leadership as a falsifying leadership. While the king’s charisma, which may 
come from glory in battle, is vulnerable to turning into derision with the king’s next defeat, the 
philosopher’s parrhesia, which may appear in harangues and unwanted admonishments, is dis-
tinctly endowed with its own virility and invulnerability to misfortune. It is invulnerable to deri-
sion because it is already derisory. It is derisory in that the parrhesiast’s life is a militant life 
against false customs. If the charismatic king battles for his own health and that of the communi-
ty, the parrhesiast battles for self and others against conventions. The Cynic practices poverty 
against the custom of exalting wealth, displays a bare body against the custom of clothing, and 
intervenes into the lives of passersby by giving them unsolicited advice on caring for themselves 
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against customs of politeness. Most importantly of all, the Cynic falsifies the currency against the 
flows of circulation of wealth and debt that the Alexandrian currency entails. Falsification of 
myth is the calling of the parrhesiast, a calling not to guard conventions but a call to arms against 
convention. Foucault lectures that the Cynic military battle is: 
 
a battle against customs, conventions, institutions, laws, and a whole condition of humanity. It 
is a battle against vices, but these are not the individual’s vices. They are vices which afflict hu-
mankind as a whole, the vices of men which take shape, rely upon, or are at the root of their 
customs, ways of doing things, laws, political organizations, or social conventions. The Cynic 
battle is therefore not simply that military or athletic battle by which the individual ensures self-
mastery and thereby benefits others. The Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional, and constant 
aggression directed at humanity in general, at humanity in its real life, and whose horizon or 
objective is to change its moral attitude (its ethos) but, at the same time and thereby, its cus-
toms, conventions, and ways of living.50  
 
Parrhesia is a battle to destroy myths that give rise to customs, whereas charisma allows for – and 
sometimes centers on – the production of myths. This is the decisive difference between charisma 
and parrhesia.  
 
Comparing the Oeuvres of Foucault and Weber 
This accord and discord between Weber and Foucault on the concept of charisma – supposedly 
the prime exemplar of the sort of personalized conception of human relations that Foucault de-
voted his career to efface – demands explanation. How could Foucault, after decades of demon-
strating that the subject is the outcome of modes of veridiction in psychiatry, sexuality, and crim-
inology, modes imbricated in power relations, propose subject formation as self-constitution? 
And, how could Foucault do so in a manner that is in such close parallel to Weber’s notion of 
charismatic leadership? I present their oeuvres below to show that congruencies between the two 
authors go beyond the concepts of charisma and parrhesia to shared concerns about modern 
forms of Menschentum and governmental subjectivity, and that these concepts remain essential to 
each author’s overall focus of study and to their relation with one another.  
Let me be clear at the outset that my intention is not at all to make the case that some kind 
of break or turn can be found in Foucault’s later work. To the contrary, I believe that there are 
principles that pull together, perhaps even unify, his body of work. What I demonstrate below 
can be thought of as taking in a different direction Mathew Sharpe’s argument that Foucault’s 
reading of Kant demands that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason itself be reread.51 My argument is that 
Weber’s concept of charisma be reread in light of Foucault’s parrhesia with an awareness of pre-
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cisely how their two bodies of work, Foucault’s and Weber’s, share features and diverge from one 
another. 
Although Weber is understood in highly sophisticated terms by Weberians, his general 
reputation in the United States remains linked to methodological individualism, a particular read-
ing of value-free social science, and a tragic story of an evolutionary and universalist rationality. 
If asked what the central thematic of Weber is, an American scholar – familiar with Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, his essays on politics and science as vocations, and per-
haps some extracts from Economy and Society – might mistakenly say that Weber’s main concern 
was with the evolution of rationalism and with sociological methodology. Yet, if one reads these 
works, the concern with Weber’s central question is only likely to heighten. The diverse interests 
expressed in single essays, let alone the various themes of his many, often fragmented, writings, 
may well leave one wondering what motivated Weber’s interests and, more than this, what We-
ber is trying to say. Part of the problem is with the various partially successful translations of his 
work, but the question of the central thematic is also pertinent to Weber’s German-speaking audi-
ences.  
Partly responsible for debates over Weber’s writing are the difficulties it poses. It is charac-
terized by a sparkling clarity that obscures irony and play in the positions he presents; features 
that combine to form subtly composed demands to rethink conventions and even his own argu-
ments.52 It also presents the challenge of a seemingly drastic shift in focus – from the Protestant 
ethic to the sociology of religion in his last writing before his death – that is not unlike Foucault’s 
own “trip to Greece.”  
In a spirited article responding to a claim that Weber’s central thematic is the universal, in-
exorable, rationalization of life, Wilhelm Hennis addresses the question of Weber’s oeuvre by di-
recting readers to Weber’s use of the key word Lebensführung in the following quote by Max We-
ber: “It is the spirit of a 'methodical' Lebensführung which should be 'derived' from 'asceticism' in 
its Protestant transformation and which stands in a cultural-historical relation of 'adequacy-
equivalence' (Adaquanz) which is in my opinion very important.”53 In other words, the explana-
tion Weber himself provides for writing Protestant Ethic is to “derive” the spirit of a Lebensführung 
(the particular conduct or leadership of life specific to capitalism) from Protestant asceticism. We-
ber’s interest is not to derive a general rationality, whatever that may be, but to give an account 
for the rise of an “ethical Lebensstil,”54 a stylization of life, that is “spiritually adequate to the eco-
nomic stage of capitalism” and which “signifies its triumph in the ‘souls’ of men.”55 The Lebensfüh-
                                                 
52 Chapters 3 and 4 of Arpad Szakolczai’s Max Weber and Michel Foucault Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel 
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rung of Weber’s interest comes with a Habitus that cannot be generalized away, and displays a 
characteristic tension between vocation, life and ethics whose effect is this manhood, a particular 
kind of rationalized manhood, Menschentum. Hennis’ point is that Weber’s central theme is not 
the process of rationalization in toto, but the development of the specificity of Menschentum, 
whose Lebensführung is the object of his investigation.56 
Hennis’ depiction reveals affinity in the oeuvres of Weber and Foucault. Compare the pair 
of terms Lebensführung (the conduct, literally leadership, of life) with Foucault’s la conduite de la 
conduite. Foucault introduces us to the phrase “conduct” in discussions of medieval Christian pas-
toral power, which involves a “highly specific form of conducting men” having to do with the 
“conduct of souls.”57 That is, pastoral power conducts the conduct of individuals by way of con-
ducting their souls. This form of power is reawakened, according to Foucault, and central to the 
rise of governmentality. Like Lebensführung, the conduct of conduct is about the government, the 
self- and other-leadership, of life. And like Lebensführung, conduct of conduct in pastoral power 
has produced a specific governmentality which we understand and treat as natural and central to 
our political economy.58 For both Weber and Foucault, the Menschentum produced in capitalism – 
that is, the subject of capitalist calculation – is precisely not a universal, general, and rationalized 
subject.  
In a thorough but ultimately flawed study of Weber’s and Foucault’s oeuvres, David Owen 
correctly points to the heart of the matter, which is that Weber and Foucault share two essential 
influences in Kant and Nietzsche. It would be fair to say that the “origin” of the question that 
drives both their studies is Kant’s presentation of life as a philosophical problem in his “What is 
Enlightenment?” Owen’s contribution is his detailed study of how one can trace, from Kant to 
Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault, trajectories of the critique of modernity, but the problem with 
Owen’s depiction is that it is too linear with each successor solving prior problems. His is not the 
first time either Weber’s or Foucault’s work has been linked to Nietzsche,59 but it is one of a few 
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book-length studies devoted to applying their common influences to link Weber and Foucault to 
one another.60 
For Owen, Nietzsche’s great contribution is his stance against Hegel’s position that maturi-
ty is “self-actualization,” the realization of one’s own authentic being, and Nietzsche’s own inter-
pretation of maturity as “self-overcoming, as the ongoing process of becoming what one is.”61 
Nietzsche offers the method of genealogy for evaluating values in this ongoing process in history, 
and finds that modern culture is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence due to an absence 
of any grounds for evaluation that would enable the exercise of autonomy. Nietzsche offers, as an 
alternative ground, an aesthetics of time by posing the moment as the threshold at which all fu-
ture and all past extends. The experience of time as such is the eternal recurrence of the experi-
ence of the self-generating value of existence. In Owen’s work we clearly see the shared im-
portance of Nietzsche’s übermensch for Weber and Foucault. To the extent that eternal recurrence 
is culturally substantiated, individuals with autonomy for self-legislation (Nietzsche’s übermensch) 
will rise up and reintroduce value to the modern world. Weber and Foucault share an interest in 
refining Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return by investigating what culturally substantiating it 
would entail, and by historically seeking out modes of being that substantiate Nietzsche’s über-
mensch.  
Both Weber and Foucault refine and reproduce Nietzsche’s immanent critique of Kant and 
reconsider the problem of grounds for value in modernity. The paradox of Weber’s Menschentum 
is that its distinctive capacity for achieving an inner distance for autonomy accompanies a disen-
chantment that leaves it bereft of the ground of values that would give meaning to human action. 
Weber’s hope out of this lay in the ethical cultivation of the self that results in individuals and 
communities endowed with charisma, which substantiates the eternal return and reintroduces 
value to the modern world. It is here that one can find the shared concern of Foucault and Weber. 
Weber and Foucault respectively see Menschentum and governmentality as the product of pastoral 
power that has been displaced from its religious origins. This rise of Menschen-
tum/governmentality, as both clearly recognize, occurs with the rise of capitalism after the capital-
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labor encounter, or in Marxist terms, real subsumption after formal subsumption, and in Deleu-
zoGuattarian terms, spiritualized Urstaat after capital.62 
 
 
Different Lives: Leadership to the Human Condition in Foucault and Weber 
One may still be tempted to seek comfort in the thought that charisma is precisely what Foucault 
is not interested in, and that parrhesia should not be confused with charisma. I have shown above 
that parrhesia and charisma share too many features to characterize Foucault’s relation to Weber 
so easily. Furthermore, the problem with any ready dismissal of charisma as an individualist in-
sertion of authority is simply that, as we have seen, the charismatic relation is not constitutive in 
the sense of making up relations of hierarchy, and so plebiscitarian leadership cannot be a ‘natu-
ral’ outgrowth of charisma. Charisma is destined to be fleeting and at most create a charismatic 
community, which is a strictly limited communistic community that itself knows no hierarchy. 
Although for Weber a charismatic community of trustis can form over time, this community con-
stitutes nothing: no central demand, no meaningful identity, no offices, no hierarchy, no bureau-
cracy, and no formal laws. Any notion of a statewide, legislating charisma cannot be about cha-
risma itself. What, then, does charismatic authority do? It instills charismatic qualifications in oth-
ers where charismatic qualification describes particular conditions of calling from among the infi-
nitely divisible and variable ways by which disciples may feel called.  
The problem with Weber’s charismatic plebiscitarian politician argument is that it implies 
that the characteristics of the plebiscitarian politician are charismatic characteristics.63 In particu-
lar, the plebiscitarian politician must have an ethic of responsibility to meet the demands of the 
day in one’s vocation, and a sense of distance to mediate between ultimate values and daily de-
mands. Certainly, Weber affirms these qualities in his “Politics as a Vocation,” but the problem is 
that there is no reason to believe (and every reason not to believe) that Weber was describing cha-
risma as affirming an ethic of responsibility. As we have seen, the charismatic relation is entirely 
opposed to something like an ethic of responsibility which “takes account of precisely the average 
deficiencies of people,” does not presuppose their “goodness and perfection” to do the right 
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thing, and acts in terms of an economy of consequences.64 Arguments against charisma on the 
basis of a political stance against plebiscitarian authoritarianism recreate the plebiscitarian politi-
cian as a fully charismatic personality, and base their critique of the charismatic personality on a 
novel construction of the charismatic. The problem is that by Weber’s own descriptions, a charis-
matic relation is to a great extent at odds with hierarchical, office-holding plebiscitarian leader-
ship, and Weber’s definition of charisma blurs to accommodate a plebiscitarian stance. Charisma 
cannot itself be criticized for being authoritarian and plebiscitarian. The argument against We-
ber’s politics on the basis of charisma itself does not hold, but a much more interesting problem in 
Weber’s work will be raised below. 
 
Foucault, Governmentalities, and the Parrhesiastic Modality 
It was through, not in spite of, the study of sexuality that Foucault arrived at the concept of the 
care of the self. Through his research on sexuality, Foucault made the remarkable discovery that 
more than being just an indicator of power, sex is also an indicator of the subject in relationship to 
truth.65 This relation of subjectivity to truth develops Foucault’s previous work by adding a third 
dimension to the previously known power and knowledge. We should no longer be confident as 
Foucauldians that we can see our sexual identities as formatted by a dominant power and confine 
our agency strictly to a resistance to that power.  
Through his studies of sexual practices in Antiquity, Foucault was able to locate “the form 
and effects” of the relation of the self to truth as particular elements in the constitution of experi-
ence and distinguish these effects with respect to the more familiar effects of knowledge and 
power. In undertaking this turn, Frédéric Gros reminds us, “Foucault does not abandon politics to 
dedicate himself to ethics, but complicates the study of governmentalities through the exploration 
of the care of the self.”66 Foucault had to distance himself from the “terrain” of modernity, in 
which he had so forcefully found the binding apparatuses of knowledge and power, to see the 
significance of practices of the self. From here on we must add, in addition to Foucault’s famous 
focus on the imbrications of power and knowledge, the subject who emerges in practices of the 
self.67  
The significance of introducing the subject to power and knowledge is clearly illustrated in 
a short passage of an unpublished manuscript that Foucault had prepared for his first Collège de 
France course that centers on the techniques of the care of the self; a passage found in Gros’ 
“Course Context” at the end of Hermeneutics of the Subject.68 Foucault notes that, since Descartes, 
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philosophy has developed the figure of a subject who is capable of accessing truth through 
knowledge, and capable of right action only by way of being enlightened by truth. In Antiquity, 
on the other hand, Foucault sees another access to truth by way of a drastic ethical conversion. 
The question of interest to Foucault is whether the former has entirely displaced the latter. If the 
answer is affirmative, then “the question of whether the subject’s being must be brought into 
play” in accessing truth can be set aside.69 If ethical conversion cannot be displaced, then “virtues 
and experiences” from ethical conversions will have a certain “form” and “force” that must be 
taken into account in the emergence of the subject. It is here, through the subject, that Foucault 
tries to escape Marxist humanism to propose a response to the question of how the capital-labor 
encounter evolved into capitalism. Rejecting a theory of objective knowledge or a new analysis of 
signifying systems, Foucault turns to putting “the subject back into the historical domain of prac-
tices and processes in which he has been constantly transformed,” where the subject is now a sub-
ject of knowledge, a subject of power, and a subject of practices of the self.70  
In his second Collège de France course on the care for the self, published as The Govern-
ment of Self and Others, Foucault displaces the phrase “care for the self” with truth-telling, “par-
rhesia,” and begins the course by revisiting Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?” Here, for the first 
time, the question of how to critically interpret agency is staged not in terms of “desubjectifica-
tion” through resistance to knowledge/power deployments, but with regard to parrhesia. In Fou-
cault’s last course, published as The Courage of Truth, parrhesia is presented with three characteris-
tics. The first of these is that parrhesia is clearly placed in relation to governmentality. Foucault 
says, “It seems to me that by examining the notion of parrhesia we can see how the analysis of 
veridiction, the study of techniques of governmentality, and the identification of forms of practic-
es of the self interweave.”71 Parrhesia is a practice of self-making through veridiction rather than 
through the acquisition of knowledge. It is a technique of the government of the self and others 
that is distinct from domination. It is a formation of the practices of the self rather than a deduc-
tion of the subject. Since practices of self-making vary, and since they variably involve deploy-
ments of knowledge and power, for the first time Foucault speaks of “governmentalities” to de-
scribe the various rationalities of practices. These rationalities do not necessarily result from 
knowledge and power deployments alone, and can now also sometimes be seen to create effects 
that directly counter those deployments. Secondly, parrhesia occurs in a relationship that is not 
egalitarian in that it is a relationship of leadership, the government of self and others. As we learn 
from the danger of practicing parrhesia in democracy, parrhesia necessarily creates an inequality 
between speaker and listener. A third characteristic of parrhesia is that it involves ethical differen-
tiation on the part of the listener – understood as a process of valuation that necessitates bringing 
truth into play in the construction of the self. Ethical differentiation can be positively compared to 
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Weber’s “charismatic qualifications” in that both take truth into play in the construction of the 
self and both involve valuation – the latter not as some moral quality only available to a leader, 
but in the part of all those involved in the relationship.  
My point here is that it is in Foucault’s studies of the practices of the self, and particularly 
of parrhesia, that he provides viability for the realization of techniques for creating the self with 
respect to truth in modernity. I should be clear that Foucault is not optimistic about this possibil-
ity: He says, “And what about the modern epoch, you may ask? I don’t really know. It would no 
doubt have to be analyzed. We could say perhaps—but these are hypotheses, not even hypothe-
ses: … [T]he parrhesiastic modality has, I believe, precisely disappeared as such, and we no long-
er find it except where it is grafted on or underpinned” by truth-telling as prophecy, technical 
expertise, or philosophical discourse on being.72  
 
Foucault and Weber: Two Distinct Projects Regarding Leadership 
What does all this mean for the relation between Weber’s and Foucault’s work? I think that the 
resemblance of parrhesia in Foucault’s work to charisma in Weber’s work is not coincidental. In 
both cases, what is of concern is the insertion of value into a life run by, on the one hand, a phi-
losophy of government embodied in pastoral power, and on the other, by a politics of interests 
played out in the domain of law.  
The importance of this similarity becomes clearer on reading about Foucault’s position 
with respect to Weber’s oeuvre. Foucault himself says that Weber’s works on modern enterprise 
“support the neo-liberal project.”73 In line with this view, Colin Gordon describes Weber’s some-
what ambivalent position in the German liberal Nationalokonomie platform of his time. Within this 
group, Weber recommended the insertion of reason of state as the contingent value-criterion of 
political economy, that is, as a means by which to insert value into political economy. Careful use 
of the state as a criterion would enable the retention of economic rationality while at the same 
time imbuing, from above, the society with value-rationality.74 This is done by the entry into poli-
tics of the “man of calling for politics” whose charisma is tempered in maturity by his ethic of 
responsibility.75 Weber’s most personal depiction of charisma comes in the form of the plebisci-
tarian leader; an individual Weber realizes is hard to come by. He must have great convictions 
that are unconventional to society, yet have an ethic of responsibility to uphold society’s conven-
tions. He must guard society and yet bring in the new. The psychic tensions this creates seem un-
bearable. Which comes first, guardianship or transformation? What if the two confront one an-
other head on and the very thing the plebiscitarian leader is called to guard is what must change? 
Weber’s is a therapeutic stance regarding the insertion of reason of state into political economy by 
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those who take on the heavy burden of politics as a vocation. The problem with this stance is that 
it asks too much of the plebiscitarian politician, who is expected to respect conventions – includ-
ing the custom for acquisitiveness – and yet be devoted to change. Weber wants charisma to play 
the crucial role in modernity that his own depiction of charisma seems to defy. In a Weberian 
mode, charismatic insertion of the new would have the effect of crumbling the imagined walls 
that economists like to think separate private from public interests while it went about its busi-
ness of adding value-rationality to the rationally interested and acquisitive character of Menschen-
tum. This is Weber’s project, one that forces a modality that ultimately falsifies custom into the 
vocation of upholding custom.  
For Foucault, sovereign and pastoral power in modernity is a totalizing and individualiz-
ing power whose interest lies in society as omnes et singulatum.76 While Weber would recognize 
the potentially totalizing power of pastoralism, he would not recognize the individualizing power 
of discipline in the same sense as Foucault. For Weber, religion and politics can instill a certain 
government of self, as with Protestant inner-worldly asceticism, but Gordon reminds us that We-
ber would be deeply suspicious of governmentality as “rationality pertaining to the conduct of 
others’ conduct.”77 For Weber, government as the conduct of others’ conduct could only have one 
rationality, and this would be of those fearful to act as a result of overwhelming coercive power; 
those “who have police in their very bones.”78 Therefore, Weber did not seek to comparatively 
investigate the governmentalities involved with the conduct of others’ conduct, since all such ra-
tionality would be labeled suspicious for being veiled coercion. For Weber, there is reason of 
state, which is a criterion by which charisma can be introduced into rational government, and 
there is governmentality among those with police in their bones, which is an undesirable attribute 
that would retard individual liberties and thus one that cannot describe Menschentum.  
Whereas Foucault finds that the modern state is the effect of a combined pastoral and ju-
ridical power, for Weber the modern state is constantly in jeopardy of relinquishing reason of 
state to capitalism, where the latter is understood as an ethos of acquisitiveness in the absence of 
grounds of value. For Weber the issue was to give value to this ethos through expert scientific 
valuation, and importantly through the entry of individuals carrying a charisma cultivated within 
an ethic of responsibility which would somehow – and Weber is not clear how – affect the popu-
lation. Reason of state is, for Weber, nothing more than a useful channel by which to instill new 
values in people. What Weber did not see in his pre-Hitler world was that not only charisma, but 
also governmentality, pertains to those processes that fall into the rubric of reason of state. Gor-
don writes, “If Weber is not a noted theoretician of this topic [of individual existence as a concern 
of the state], this may be because he is one of its most passionate and pragmatically committed 
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exponents.”79 After all, for Weber the way out of the iron cage of capitalism is not to critique ac-
quisitiveness, but to try to instill, through state politics, Menschentum with a new Lebensführung.  
If this is Weber’s project, then what does it tell us of how Foucault’s is different? If Fou-
cault sought out parrhesia in ancient Greek cultures as Weber sought out charisma in medieval 
kingship and religion, then how are their two projects different? The answer in my view lies in 
the appropriate domain in which they felt leadership could be enacted. Whereas Weber wants 
leadership to remain exclusively in the hands of those who use state institutions so that they act 
on collective identities, such as the nation and civil society, for Foucault leadership is a means by 
which the ethical difference of truth can come into play in self construction. It is the means by 
which customs can be falsified. As such, the domain of this play of truth cannot be at the level of 
society or people, at which point the issue of quantity and the problem of always being a minority 
becomes the determining factor in assessing truth, as seen in the Greek democratic example. Ad-
ditionally, the Cynic experience speaks to the force of the play of truth that interweaves with life 
itself – in life lived as truth. If Weber is looking to enhance modern governmentality by having 
charismatic leaders of state institutions introject value into the Menschentum’s governmentality, 
Foucault is looking to leadership to disturb and destruct this governmentality’s effects at the ca-
pillaries of power. By acting at the capillaries of power, Foucauldian leadership enables the crea-
tion of collectivities in which practices of the self confront biopolitical and disciplinary deploy-
ments. Foucault’s focus on Cynic parrhesia specifically speaks to Foucault’s conception of leader-
ship as a philosophical activity of falsification. Philosophical heroism is the art of making life a 
philosophical problem, an art cultivated by legendary histories of philosophical lives, and 
through a “traditionality of existence” that displaces the traditionality of doctrine by taking les-
sons from histories of philosophical lives and modes of heroism. As such, leadership at the capil-
laries of power is neither passive nor quotidian. It is a life both of self-creation and of the self-
creation of heroes as a stylistics of existence. 
For Foucault, parrhesia as a technology of the self is active particularly in the last of three 
dimensions – truth-telling, governmentality, and subjectivation – of his research, and in its Cynic 
form is key to the entry of the subject’s morality at the intersection of knowledge and power. For 
this reason, namely that leadership matters in political formations and in changing the societal 
effects of knowledge and power, leadership should be recognized and studied for its capacity to 
constitute subjects. Foucault found himself turning to Weber much more closely in his later years, 
by which time he must have been well aware of the affinities between charisma and parrhesia. 
This turn to Weber can be attributed, at least in part, to the work of Paul Veyne and Pasquale 
Pasquino, who themselves have published works that speak to the vibrant tension between We-
ber and Foucault.80 It is at this point in his life that Foucault is quoted as saying “if Nietzsche in-
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terests me, this is only to the extent that Nietzsche for Weber was absolutely determining, even if 
in general it is not said.”81 Foucault and Weber problematized leadership in affinal, but in the 
senses discussed above opposing, terms. This puts a vitalizing tension into the apposition of their 
work, and more pertinently lays the groundwork for a revitalized study of leadership as a tech-
nology of self creation.  
 
Foucault, Parrhesia, and Modernity 
Both Foucault and Weber stress that leadership, respectively as parrhesia and charisma, is absent 
in modern state society. While Weber frames this as disenchantment, for Foucault the pastoral 
power conducted in networks of relations in biopolitical governmentality is individualizing in 
such a way as to somehow undo, neutralize, or suppress parrhesia. Foucault writes, “the individ-
ualization assured by the exercise of pastoral power” is an individualization that is no longer “de-
fined by an individual’s status, birth, or the splendor of his actions.”82 By the phrase “splendor of 
his actions,” I think we can understand both the valorous charismatic actions of feudal warfare 
and the parrhesiastic actions in the Socratic and Cynic mode. This suppression, neutralization or 
otherwise disappearance of parrhesiastic technologies of the self in pastoralism describes “proce-
dures of human individualization in the West.” In a Weberian reading of Foucault, the project 
may simply be that such technologies have to be reintroduced into modern society. My suspicion 
is that the problem is nowhere near as simple as this. Before we can call upon a reinvigoration of 
parrhesiastic technologies, we should ask ourselves precisely what happened to parrhesiastic 
technologies in modernity. How is it that authority, dictated by parrhesia in such exemplars as 
Socrates and especially Diogenes, is now dominantly something given and changeable by the rit-
uals of confession found, for example, in electoral cycles? 
I have shown in this paper that Foucault’s interest in parrhesia in his research of Greek 
practices of the self can be read as an attempt to take the concept of charisma in a direction that 
Weber would not. For Weber, charisma is a problematic vehicle by which value might be instilled 
in rationalized citizens, and he turned to religion late in his career with the interest of exploring 
how their charismatic dimensions may be imported as a therapy for the rationalized citizen. For 
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Foucault, parrhesia is a form of government of the self and others that gives subjects the autono-
my of action by which to confront the imbrications of power and knowledge with techniques of 
self-formation in relation to truth. Foucault turns to Greek – particularly Cynic – parrhesia in 
search of techniques of the self that do not seem to exist in modernity, and with an interest in 
learning something of what (and how) other, similar techniques could be reintroduced in moder-
nity. Importantly, while Weber is ambivalent about whether charisma shirks tradition and legal-
rationality to inaugurate the new, sometimes writing of the charismatic’s vulnerability to deri-
sion, for Foucault the parrhesiast is the king of derision who falsifies customs and currencies and 
so has a kingship immune to derision. While their intended applications may seem the same –
they both intend to introduce leadership in modernity – taken on a broader scale of their overall 
work, they are clearly entirely different. While Weber turns to charisma to add value to the life of 
the capitalist subject, Foucault turns to parrhesia in search of a weapon with which to attack net-
works of pastoral power. 
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